UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1203
21 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 OCTOBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Especially in view of our letter to the Security Council contained in document S/1994/1175 of 17 October 1994, addressing the problem of the dilution of the Security Council mandate to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), we would like to re-emphasize our growing concern and impatience as evidenced by recent actions, or more accurately non-actions by the UNPROFOR command.

On Tuesday, 18 October 1994, "Bosnian Serb" forces opened fire on a United Nations humanitarian convoy on the outskirts of the "safe area" of Gorazde. A Bosnian driver employed under the United Nations mandate was killed and another seriously wounded. According to our information, the UNPROFOR Commander on the scene immediately called in for NATO air action, only to be rebuffed by the UNPROFOR Commander for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, who "enjoys cordial relations with General Mladic". As repeated by The New York Times (18 October 1994), a local United Nations spokesman indicated "the request was turned down by General Rose after a conversation between him and the Bosnian Serb commander, General Ratko Mladic".

The "Bosnian Serb" attack is by no means unique in scope of frequency, but part of a systematic campaign of intimidation and the strangulation of Bosnian cities, in particular the besieged eastern enclaves like Gorazde. We must also compare the response of the UNPROFOR commander in this instance to a similar attack upon French peace-keepers on 22 September 1994, which prompted a NATO retaliatory airstrike. We would like to believe that the life of a Bosnian employed under the United Nations mandate is not deemed of lesser value than of non-Bosnians working under the identical mandate and for the same objectives. Unfortunately, we have good reason to believe otherwise. While attacks on non-Bosnians have prompted a more resolute response, this attack triggered a telephone call to the commander of the murderers of this United Nations-mandated employee and citizen of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

According to the same New York Times article, General Rose recently wrote a letter to General Mladic saying: "I fully agree with you that we must in the future avoid all situations that necessitate the use of force, whether applied

from the ground or the air. We can only do this through close liaison and cooperation ... It is not part of our mission to impose any solution through force of arms. We are neither mandated nor deployed for this."

We must inquire under which mandate General Rose believes he is acting within, and why he has chosen to delegitimize mandates specifically provided under Security Council resolutions 770 (1992), 824 (1993), 836 (1993), 913 (1994) and others. As we have become aware of other actions by General Rose, including discussing alternatives to the Contact Group peace plan and territorial settlements with "Bosnian Serb" leaders, we must wonder why the Contact Group members have not responded to this undermining of civilian authority by a military commander acting without mandate and presumably with no other directive. As for the issue of the cordial relations between General Mladic and General Rose, we will allow those who have accused General Mladic of war crimes and provided evidence of his crimes to assess the propriety of this relationship under any circumstances.

It is our view that, in most armies subject to civilian authority, General Rose's actions would at least garner a review of a potential court martial. We do not believe this assessment to be exaggerated, and instead we should question why there is no such review when the United Nations, rather than national authority, is involved. Regardless of General Rose's other qualifications, good intentions or past courageous service on behalf of his nation, his actions now do not do justice to the brave and committed individuals acting under United Nations mandate to help provide our appreciative people and Republic with the desperately needed relief and assistance. Alas, we must suspect that General Rose should not bear the brunt of the responsibility for the erosion and delegitimization of Security Council resolutions. Unfortunately, there may be other factors and authorities responsible, especially outside of UNPROFOR. General Rose may only be the awkward expression of these factors and authorities.

The murdered driver's name was Dzemail Hendo, 37 years of age.

May I ask for you kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1204
22 October 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 18 OCTOBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TUNISIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the pleasure, as Chairman of the Arab Group for October 1994, to transmit to you herewith, at the request of the Group, the text of a letter concerning the situation in Somalia and the importance of a continued United Nations presence there to prevent a renewed deterioration of security conditions and facilitate national reconciliation among the different Somali factions.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Slaheddine ABDELLAH
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter from the Arab Group to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Arab Group, referring to the resolution on the situation in Somalia adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its 102nd ordinary session, feels it necessary, after an extensive review and an in-depth study of that situation, to communicate to you its concerns regarding this matter:

1. In taking this initiative, the Group wishes to express its profound appreciation to the international community for its commitment, its generosity and its patience in dealing with the crisis in Somalia, thus warding off a major human crisis.

2. The Arab Group considers that, in spite of the slow pace observed in achieving national reconciliation and in finding a political solution, some perceptible progress has been achieved in the decline in fighting among factions and the greater inclination of their leaders towards negotiation. In view of these favourable, albeit slow, developments and the likelihood that a sudden, total withdrawal of the United Nations forces from Somalia might create a void that would lead to a new flare-up of war in the country, the Arab Group strongly recommends proceeding on the basis of the following principles:

- The mission of the United Nations forces in Somalia, namely to ensure a stable environment favourable to humanitarian activities and conducive to a suitable political solution, should be continued;

- Any withdrawal of the United Nations forces from Somalia must take place gradually, in successive stages, so as to enable the Somali leaders to overcome their differences and form a central authority;

- A political mission must be sent by the Security Council as soon as possible to apprise the Somali people of the Council's view regarding the future of the United Nations forces in Somalia and the need to speed up the process of reconciliation. The mission, moreover, must be sent before the Security Council takes any further decision regarding the future of the peace-keeping forces in Somalia;

- In conjunction with a gradual reduction of the United Nations forces in Somalia, available funds must be employed to raise the country's economic and social level, to rebuild, to continue the reconciliation process and to arrive at a political solution;

- The Somali leaders must, without any further delay, hold an expanded conference on reconciliation to constitute a critical turning-point in the reconciliation process;

- The United Nations must redouble its efforts to encourage national reconciliation and arrive at a political solution in Somalia. To that end, it must coordinate its efforts with those of the central dispute-settlement structure of the Organization of African Unity, neighbouring States and the League of Arab States.

3. The Arab Group strongly feels the need at this stage for a continued United Nations presence to ensure the future of Somalia. The tragic experience of Rwanda following the abrupt reduction of international forces there should be a sufficient lesson to the international community. Additional efforts must therefore be made to prevent any escalation of tension in Somalia.

4. The Arab Group appeals to the Security Council to extend the mission of the international forces in Somalia, in an initial stage, to the end of March 1995 and urges the international community as a whole to assist in the reconciliation process during this period. It wishes to emphasize the need for Somali leaders to cooperate with the international community in the endeavour to find a solution to the crisis in Somalia and to make every effort to arrive at an acceptable political solution in the shortest possible time.

5. The Arab Group reaffirms its commitment to striving in every conceivable way, in a spirit of cooperation, coordination and joint endeavour, to assist the United Nations in its efforts in that direction. It is essential, in the present situation, to endeavour to avert chaos and help create a civil society. The responsibility for averting violence and chaos and constituting a national government belongs first and foremost to the Somalis themselves. It is the task of the international community to extend a helping hand to assist them in achieving those goals.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1205
23 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 21 OCTOBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With reference to documents S/1994/1128 and S/1994/1177 and upon instructions from the Government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, I have the honour to submit a copy of official note No. 94/10/41 dated 18 October 1994 from the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Permanent Mission of Uzbekistan to the United Nations.

I would appreciate it if arrangements could be made for its distribution as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ravan FARHADI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Text of the note dated 18 October 1994 from the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Permanent Mission of Uzbekistan to the United Nations

The Permanent Mission of the Islamic State of Afghanistan to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to note No. N 15569/94/10 dated 17 October 1994 from the Permanent Mission of Uzbekistan and states the following:

The Islamic State of Afghanistan highly values the brotherly ties between the Afghan and Uzbek nations, deeply rooted in history. Afghanistan happily welcomed the accession of Uzbekistan to independence.

The Government of Afghanistan appreciates the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan reiterating the inadmissibility of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan as well as their proposal regarding the embargo on the supply of weapons into the zones of regional conflicts.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan firmly believes that only friendly negotiations aimed at the consolidation of good-neighbourly and brotherly relations between the two countries can pave the way for making Afghanistan-Uzbekistan common boundaries as a frontier of peace, security and cooperation.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan therefore proposes the holding of direct bilateral Afghan-Uzbek talks at the ministerial level in the coming weeks in Tashkent.

The negotiations would be aimed at solving any problem that could jeopardize the existence of trust and mutual confidence necessary to the strengthening of close and friendly relations between the two neighbours and the broadening of commercial exchanges.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1206
22 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached communication which he has received from the Acting Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Annex

Letter dated 18 October 1994 from the Acting Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) addressed to the Secretary-General

Please find attached the report of the twenty-sixth International Atomic Energy Agency inspection in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). You may deem it appropriate to transmit the report to the members of the Security Council. The Director General remains, of course, available with the Chief Inspector, Mr. Garry Dillon, for any consultations you or the Council may wish to have.

(Signed) Boris SEMENOV
Acting Director General

Enclosure

Report on the twenty-sixth IAEA on-site inspection in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

22 August to 7 September 1994

SALIENT POINTS

The following activities were carried out in the course of the twenty-sixth IAEA inspection in Iraq: (i) an investigation of Iraq's former activities in the field of laser isotope separation; (ii) the implementation of activities in connection with the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) plan, with particular respect to the utilisation of machine tools, non-nuclear materials and other equipment; (iii) inspections at sites associated with the former nuclear weapons programme. A total of 16 facilities, installations and sites were visited in the course of this inspection.

- An investigation was carried out, principally at the Tuwaitha site, into Iraq's former activities in the area of laser isotope separation (LIS) covering the procurement and development of laser equipment and research in both molecular (MLIS) and atomic vapour (AVLIS) laser isotope separation technologies. The investigation resulted in an admission by Iraq, that contrary to previous statements, they had, during the period 1981 to 1987, assigned resources to the task of exploring the feasibility of LIS, as a means of producing enriched uranium. In connection with this investigation, visits were made to Tarmiya, the Laser Department of the Baghdad Technical University and the College of Science at the University of Baghdad.

- Inspections were carried out at six sites where items of equipment subject to routine monitoring in accordance with Annex 3 of the OMV plan were located.

- Inspections were also carried out at four sites with previous nuclear or nuclear related missions or which had provided support to the former nuclear programme, at one site which has been judged to have capabilities which could contribute to a reconstituted nuclear programme and at two sites with a means of electrical supply greater than 10 MVA.

- Concurrently with this inspection the IAEA established its continuous presence in Iraq in connection with the implementation of the OMV.

INTRODUCTION

1. This report summarises the results of the twenty-sixth on-site inspection carried out in Iraq by the IAEA under the United Nation Security Council resolution 687 (1991), with the assistance and co-operation of the Special Commission of the United Nations. The inspection took place from 22 August to 2 September 1994 and was lead by Garry Dillon of the IAEA as Chief Inspector. Three members of the team remained in Iraq until 7 September to carry out activities in connection with the OMV and to follow-up on matters arising from the inspection. The team consisted of 18 inspectors, comprising 11 nationalities.

2. The primary objectives of the inspection were:

- to carry out an investigation into Iraq's former activities in the area of laser isotope separation (LIS) covering the procurement and development of laser equipment and research in both molecular (MLIS) and atomic vapour (AVLIS) laser isotope separation technologies.

- to carry out inspections at sites where items of equipment subject to routine monitoring in accordance with Annex 3 of the OMV plan were located.

- to carry out inspections at sites with a previous nuclear or nuclear related missions or which had provided support to the former nuclear programme or which have been judged to have capabilities which could contribute to a reconstituted nuclear programme.

- to carry out inspections at sites with a means of electrical supply greater than 10 MVA.

INVESTIGATION INTO IRAQ'S FORMER LIS ACTIVITIES

3. In May 1994 the IAEA received information from Member States which indicated that Iraq had invested significant resources in research into uranium enrichment through laser isotope separation (LIS) involving both molecular (MLIS) and atomic vapour (AVLIS) technologies.

4. This subject of LIS was first addressed by IAEA-7 (October 1991), at which time that team had received two written statements from a senior Iraqi official denying that Iraq had undertaken any laser enrichment activities and stating that consequently there were no Iraqi personnel who had been involved in such activities.

5. Although it was difficult to accept that, having explored such a wide range of potential enrichment technologies, Iraq would have completely ignored LIS, there was no indications available at that time to support further investigation.

6. The information received in May prompted a thorough re-assessment of the situation. A detailed search for laser related topics in the current Action Team information databases identified a number of activities with respect to laser component manufacture, particularly CO_2 lasers and the manufacture of components for use in laser related experimentation. The database search also identified an abstract from

an Iraqi unclassified report entitled "Dissociation of UF_6 molecules by UV laser". This information taken together with procurement data and the information provided by the Member States formed the knowledge base for the investigation.

7. The investigation carried out by the IAEA-26 inspection team, which included five experts in laser technology, extended over five inspection days and for the first two days members of the team remained on the Tuwaitha site "round the clock" to maintain a continuous inspection regime until all relevant locations had been inspected.

8. The most significant event occurred during a seminar, presented by the Iraqi counterparts on the fifth inspection day, where a statement was made to the effect that the Laser Section 6240 had "received an objective [in 1981] from the Atomic Energy Commission to work in Laser Isotope Separation .... We started in two lines; one which is looking after the molecular and the other the atomic direction".

9. The IAEA team was also advised that when the achievements of Section 6240 were evaluated in 1987 it was decided that the project should be downgraded to a "watching brief" and that a number of key personnel should be transferred to the other programmes, notably EMIS.

10. The seminar provided a more coherent and, in some respects, more detailed explanation of the information given to the team in the course of the investigation; the major difference being that its connection with LIS was now acknowledged.

11. One IAEC staff member, who was brought to the Tuwaitha site specifically to take part in the seminar, described the work he had done on the photoionisation of sodium and rubidium. This individual appeared to be highly motivated and technically competent and described an experimental set-up that had a number of features similar to those of the equipment described in the information provided to

the IAEA by Member States. The subsequent transfer of this individual to the EMIS programme is consistent with the declared decision to downgrade the LIS related activities of Section 6240.

12. The IAEA team noted that, as now acknowledged by Iraq and contrary to their written statements in October 1991 and to the FFC [1] (June 1992), a specific task to explore the feasibility of LIS as a means of producing enriched uranium had existed. The task appears to have been poorly focused and it's limited achievements appear to be consistent with the equipment, personnel resources and expertise available.

13. The team was satisfied that the information it had gathered during the investigation, regarding the resources, capabilities and activities of Section 6240, was consistent with a loosely co-ordinated and largely empirical approach to LIS, but not consistent with the achievement of substantial progress in what is a complex technology.

14. There were no indications that the efforts of Section 6240 reached the point of an integrated experiment that achieved any isotopic separation of either elemental uranium or UF_6 or that they had developed, even the most rudimentary capabilities in either AVLIS or MLIS technologies.

15. It was also apparent from statements made in the course of the inspection by the Iraqi scientists and senior officials, that export controls and voluntary refusals on the part of several equipment suppliers had severely hampered the Iraqi LIS activities by preventing the procurement, from abroad, of critical pieces of equipment, most notably copper vapour laser systems.

16. A summary of the discussions and inspection activities carried out during this investigation is included in the Annex to this report.

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[1] The Full, Final and Complete Report of Iraq's nuclear programme required under Security Council resolution 707 (1991).

INSPECTIONS AT FACILITIES, INSTALLATIONS AND SITES

17. Inspections were carried out at seven locations, Babyl Company, Badr, Daura, Nassr, Al Nidda, Al Radwan and Saddam General Establishment, in order to survey the general activities of the facilities and to monitor the status and utilization of machine tools subject to routine monitoring in accordance with the OMV plan.

18. Many of the establishments are contributing to the Nassr Rolling Mill project but even so the majority of them appeared to be operating well below their production capacity. The team members experienced no difficulties in gaining access to production records and workpiece drawings and there were no indications that any machine tools were being used for proscribed purposes.

19. In addition to the inspections carried out at Tuwaitha and Tarmiya, referred to above, inspections were carried out at the Al Qaim phosphate fertilizer plant, at the former centrifuge production facility at Al Furat and at the Al Amil liquid nitrogen production facility. The activities carried out at Al Qaim were in connection with the work on uranium accountancy and are summarized below. The inspection at Al Furat showed that building B01 and B02 remained unchanged whilst in the rest of the facility the work on the buildings conversion was nearing completion. There was very little activity at the site and no indication that the buildings were soon to be outfitted and occupied. The activities at Al Amil were found to be consistent with the function of the facility.

20. Al Kindi, a location considered as having capabilities that could be useful to a reconstituted nuclear weapons programme, was inspected in company with the UNSCOM ballistic weapons group. Equipment subject to routine monitoring in accordance with annex 3 of the OMV plan was satisfactorily accounted for and there

were no indications that any items of equipment were being used for proscribed purposes.

21. An inspection was also carried out at Al Karkh which is a site with a means of supply of electricity greater than 10 MWe. A detailed check of the electrical power supply system was made and it was found to be consistent with the information provided by Iraq in accordance with the OMV plan.

22. The opportunity was taken to meet with the Director of the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) on the status of the preparations for the implementation of the OMV plan and the procedures that would be followed by the IAEA in carrying out its monitoring inspections, the majority of which would be unannounced. The format and content of the next issue of Iraq's OMV relevant reports was discussed and agreed in principle and the NMD Director also stated that responsible personnel had been designated at each location to facilitate the work of the IAEA and UNSCOM monitoring groups. He also advised that this relatively large group of personnel had participated in a training seminar at the NMD.

23. At the conclusion of these discussion the Chief Inspector stated that concurrently with IAEA-26 the IAEA had established its continuous presence in Iraq and was technically ready to implement the OMV plan.

URANIUM ACCOUNTANCY

24. An inspection was carried out at the Al Qaim facility and samples of phosphate rock and uranium bearing sludge were obtained. Discussions were held with facility personnel regarding some aspects of the operation of the former uranium extraction plant. These discussions and in particular the data contained in a process log book, showing all analytical data for all of the declared yellowcake production, made available to the group, clarified some technical details regarding plant operation.

25. The Iraqi counterparts were requested to arrange to pump out the water from one of the two pits of the building 73 complex liquid waste tanks. Their endeavours to do this during IAEA-26 were unsuccessful due to the burn-out of the submersible pump and the task will be completed during IAEA-27. A sample of the sludge contained in one of the liquid waste tanks was taken and was found to be similar to other waste material in store at Location C.

26. An inventory check was made of the uranium material in store at Location C and all batches identified as line entries in the IAEA-12 listing were tagged. A small number of samples were taken, primarily from previously unsampled items.

Table 1

List of facilities, installations and sites inspected in IAEA-26

1. Al Amil
2. Al Furat
3. Al Kharkh
4. Al Kindi
5. Al Nidda
6. Al Qaim
7. Al Radwan
8. Babyl Company
9. Badr
10. College of Science, University of Baghdad
11. Daura
12. Nassr
13. Saddam State Establishment
14. Tarmiya
15. Baghdad Technical University
16. Tuwaitha

Annex

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS AND INSPECTION ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT DURING THE INVESTIGATION OF IRAQ'S FORMER ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA OF LASER ISOTOPE SEPARATION

1. On the first inspection day, the team, which included five experts in laser technology, met in Tuwaitha with the Iraqi counterparts and the Chief Inspector explained that the purpose of the inspection was to re-examine the activities carried out in Iraq on laser research and development with particular respect to activities carried out involving lasers and uranium. The Iraqi counterparts were advised that the IAEA team required to interview the principal personnel involved with the Laser Section since the early 1980s and to revisit the various buildings known to be associated with laser activities in order to evaluate past and current projects and to reassess the laser equipment. The Iraqi counterparts were also advised that team members would remain in Tuwaitha "round the clock" to maintain the continuous inspection regime until all relevant locations on the site had been examined.

2. The first session of the inspection was used to review the laser activities in Tuwaitha with the head of the Department of Physics (6200) and the head of the Laser Section (6240). The Iraqi side made the opening statement that they had never regarded LIS as a practical option for uranium enrichment and stressed that all of their work in this area had been on what they considered to be proven enrichment technologies such as gaseous diffusion, EMIS and centrifuge.

3. It was explained to the team that, in 1977, the Laser Section was established in building 10 (Physics), which is contiguous with building 9 (Radio-chemistry) and in 1986 expanded into building 23 (Laboratory Workshop Building - LWB). The Laser Section was stated to have only the general objective to acquire technology. The Laser Section is currently housed in building 90, outside the berm (see figure 1).

4. The discussions were then interrupted and the IAEA team carried out an inspection at buildings 9 and 10, including the basement areas of both buildings and were shown the location on the ground floor of building 10 which was occupied by the laser section from 1977 to 1991. Smear samples were taken from this area during IAEA-26.

5. Discussions were then resumed and the Chief Inspector tabled the abstract from the paper on UF_6 dissociation; two of the discussion participants were included in the list of five co-authors of this paper. Neither of these individuals were apparently able to recall the paper. The Chief Inspector stated that it was very hard to accept that this experiment, which was significant if only because of the involvement of lasers and uranium could not be recalled and determined that discussions be suspended to enable the Iraqi counterparts to review the situation.

6. Concurrent with these two discussion sessions, a sub-group of IAEA team members, with civil, mechanical and electrical engineering expertise, had carried out a thorough inspection of the basement of building 23 (LWB). The building had sustained severe bomb damage during the Gulf war and the above ground structure had been completely demolished by the Iraqis and removed from the site in 1992. The basement area had been renovated to provide a storage facility.

7. In order to maintain a continuous inspection regime this group of personnel remained on the Tuwaitha campus overnight and made frequent, randomly timed tours of the site until the arrival of the rest of the team on the morning of the second inspection day.

8. During the morning of the second day of inspection the team carried out inspections at buildings 23, 12, 90 and 82 in order to give the members of the team with laser expertise the opportunity to examine the facilities and equipment. No new information of significance was obtained from these inspections.

9. The building inspections were followed by a discussion session. The session commenced with a restatement by the Iraqi side that "LIS had never been looked at seriously in the work done by Iraq on the front end of the fuel cycle".

10. It was also stated that laser research was nevertheless considered to be an appropriate activity to be included in the IAEC programme rather than for it to be assigned solely to the universities but that the Laser Section had, at all times, remained part of Department 6000 (IAEC) whereas all activities related to the former nuclear weapons programme were in Department 3000.

11. The Iraqi side also stated that there had been "no *indulgence* of lasers in LIS" and although some limited experimentation had been done with UF_6 there had been no isotopic separation - no isotopic enrichment. One of the five co-authors of the UF_6 dissociation paper was then able to give an overview of his work in the laser section and to describe the experiment he had carried out with UF_6.

12. He explained that the experiment described in the abstract had only been carried out once and had involved the excitation of less that one gram of UF_6 contained, at 1-3 mbar, in a sealed monel metal cell which was equipped with quartz windows and which had not been passivated. The experiment had used a XeCl Excimer laser with a pulse energy of 2-4 mJ and a pulse duration of 10 ns. The decrease in cell internal pressure was monitored throughout the experiment and the presence of UF_5 / UF_4 was stated to have been determined using X-ray diffraction techniques.

13. The team members discussed the experimental process with the author and it became evident that the work was of a rudimentary nature and would represent only a tentative step towards MLIS technology. He was most insistent that only one such experiment had been carried out and stressed that it was only with difficulty that he had been able to obtain the small amount of UF_6 that had been used.

14. He stated that the lack of appropriate lasers to permit selective dissociation to be achieved was the reason why no further work had been done in this area.

15. The Chief Inspector asked about the location of the original report, the abstract of which had been photographed during IAEA-6 and stated that it would be a valuable demonstration of openness and a meaningful technical contribution to the investigation if the Action Team could now be provided with a complete copy of the report. The Iraqi counterparts described at length the situation just prior to IAEA-6 and the instructions that had been given to surrender for destruction all technical documents associated with the former nuclear weapons programme.

16. The team acknowledged this history but countered that it would have been illogical to destroy documents after IAEA-6 since the majority of these documents had been eventually surrendered to that team. The Iraqi counterparts were therefore further encouraged to try to locate a copy of the report.

17. The Iraqi counterparts were then asked for a description of corresponding experimental work that had been done in the field of AVLIS or of any work that might have been construed to have been associated with AVLIS for example experimental high vacuum assemblies, lasers and uranium metal. There being no meaningful response to this question discussions were adjourned.

18. At this stage in the investigation all relevant locations on the Tuwaitha campus had been inspected and the decision was taken to terminate the continuous presence of team members on the site.

19. The third day of inspection started with a detailed re-examination of the coating device, located in building 12, which had some of the physical attributes of the equipment described in the information received by the IAEA on AVLIS activities thought to have been carried out in Tuwaitha.

20. The head of the group responsible for the operation of the coating device explained that he had re-commissioned the device in 1985 in building 23 and that it was then in virtually new condition, having only been previously used a few times. He then voluntarily opened up the device to enable the team members to examine the electron gun and the crucible assembly.

21. The current configuration of the vacuum chamber was such that a collimated vapour beam from the crucible would not have intersected with the flanges in the body of the vessel if these flanges had been used to accommodate windows for laser light transmission. The Iraqi scientist in charge of the coating group was adamant that the configuration of the device had not been changed since 1985, when the coating device had been commissioned in building 23, apart from the replacement of the turbo pump in 1991.

22. Smears were taken from the internals of the vacuum chamber, the electron gun and the crucible. These surfaces were also directly monitored and found to be free from alpha contamination.

23. The team resumed discussions with the Iraqi counterparts who made an opening statement confirming that Iraqi scientists had carried out a few experiments on non-selective photo-dissociation including the single experiment with UF_6 that had been described the previous day but that no spectroscopy work had been done on UF_6 or on uranium metal vapour. The Chief Inspector responded that the team needed to be informed of any experimental activity that was related to, or could appear to be related to, LIS and, in particular, AVLIS.

24. Discussions then continued on the work done by the Laser Section to develop a 10 watt copper vapour laser. The scientist in charge of this activity explained that the project was the result of his own interest, inspired by published scientific information and that he had no identified use for the laser except for spectroscopy.

25. He went on to explain that the project had been of only minor success, that the laser had never operated stably and that the best runs were typically of 10-20 minutes duration at a sustained power level of about 3 watts.

26. At the teams request this same scientist described the work he had carried out on the development of a molecular beam based on an automobile fuel injector. This project was described to have been a failure and was therefore never used in conjunction with lasers.

27. At this stage the Chief Inspector gave an overview of the information made available to the IAEA which described the AVLIS activities presumed to have been carried out in Iraq and principally at Tuwaitha. He advised the Iraqi counterparts of his own firm opinion that it was most unlikely that Iraq had solved the technical problems of AVLIS technology and therefore even more unlikely that they enriched meaningful amounts of uranium through this process.

28. He however stated himself to be firmly convinced that Iraq had done more work towards LIS than they had shared with the Action Team during the inspection and was equally firmly convinced that the reluctance of the Iraqi counterparts to admit to the actual scope of their work in this area would have damaging consequences far beyond the technical significance of the work itself.

29. The Iraqi counterparts responded that there had never been any work of the nature described in the information provided to the IAEA and that there had never been any foreign involvement in their laser activities. They however suggested that they would make arrangements to present a seminar, two days hence, on the planned final day of this phase of IAEA-26.

30. The next inspection day was used to carry out a visit to Tarmiya where buildings 33, 225, 245, 248, 271, and 381 were inspected (see figure 2). Nothing was observed

to suggest that LIS related activities, in particular pilot scale production, had been carried out at Tarmiya.

31. On the morning of the day of the seminar visits were made to the Laser Department of the Technical University and to the College of Science at the University of Baghdad.

32. The Technical University was in summer recess and the lack of activity added to the impression that the research and development programme of the Laser Department is somewhat modest. The laboratory rooms appeared to be poorly maintained and the inventory of laser and laser related equipment was unimpressive.

33. One of the reasons for the visit to the Technical University was to clarify supplier information relating to the attempted procurement, in 1989, of a 40 watt copper vapour laser.

34. The team was informed by the Dean of the University and the head of the Laser Department that the attempt to purchase this item was at the request of a, since retired, professor who had wished to use the device for an undefined project aimed at exploring techniques for the determination of air pollution by measurement of backscattered laser light.

35. When it was suggested that this was a relatively expensive item to purchase for an apparently undefined project the team was told that, in the late 1980's the annual operating budget of the Laser Department had been "five to ten" million dollars. This figure was considered, by the team, to be strongly at variance with the observed investment.

36. Summary information has since been provided by the Iraqi counterparts showing that the implemented financial plan for the two year period 1988-01-01 through 1989-12-

31 was the equivalent of US$11.6 million of which only US$0.27 million was spent on instruments and equipment whilst the major portion of the expenditure was on building costs and furnishings. The information is supported by a copy letter, dated 1990-03-26, which corroborates the summary data.

37. Nothing was seen in the Laser Department that appeared to have the potential to contribute to IAEC's investigations into LIS.

38. In contrast to the Technical University the College of Science appeared to be in session and there were many students on the campus. The coating laboratories which were inspected were well equipped and well maintained.

39. The supervisory staff were very enthusiastic about their programmes and appeared to be technically well informed. The coating systems were standard commercial systems and the associated vacuum enclosures would not have lent themselves for use in activities related to LIS.

40. An additional item of supplier information relating to the attempt to procure a twin gun electron beam melting furnace (150kW, 35kV) was discussed with the senior staff of the College but they had no knowledge of who might have been the initiator of the procurement request.

41. The Iraqi counterparts later clarified that this item was the subject of a procurement request from the Ministry of Industry for use in the melting and casting of titanium alloys.

42. The team was advised that there was no laser equipment on the campus of the University of Baghdad and laser science was included in a general science course as a theoretical topic only. Considering that there are six colleges on the campus this may have been an oversimplified answer.

43. The final session of this phase of IAEA-26 was the seminar presented by the Iraqi counterparts describing their work with lasers. The seminar provided a more coherent and, in some respects, more detailed explanation of the information given to the team in the course of the investigation and is adequately documented in the notes of the IAEA team.

44. The most significant information provided in the seminar was in the opening statement by the head of the Department of Physics (6200) who said that "I received an objective [in 1981] from the Atomic Energy Commission to work in Laser Isotope Separation... We [Laser Section 6240] started in two lines; one which is looking after the molecular and the other the atomic direction". The team were also advised that when achievements of 6240 were evaluated in 1987 it was decided that the project should be downgraded to a "watching brief" and that a number of key personnel should be transferred to other programmes, notably EMIS.

45. One IAEC staff member, who was brought to the Tuwaitha site specifically to take part in the seminar, described the work he had done on the photoionisation of sodium and rubidium. This individual appeared to be highly motivated and technically competent and described an experimental set-up that had a number of features similar to those of the equipment described in the information provided to the IAEA by Member States. The subsequent transfer of this individual to the EMIS programme is consistent with the declared decision to downgrade the LIS related activities of section 6240.

46. It was surprising that, according to the Iraqi statement, the relatively simple step of developing the technology for the production of uranium metal vapour had not been accomplished. The reason, offered during the seminar, that metallic uranium was not available in 1986 is not consistent with other information which shows that uranium metal was actually available at the end of 1986. In a later written response

to questions on this topic the statement was made that "The UV/Visible Laser section was reorganized in 1986, and even with the availability of U-metal the Laser division still did not have the means for high temperature evaporation (over 2000 C) nor had they the suitable laser power density for uranium vapour interaction with laser".

47. The IAEA team noted that, as now acknowledged by Iraq and contrary to their written statements in October 1991 and to the FFC (June 1992), a specific task to explore the feasibility of LIS as a means of producing enriched uranium had existed. The task appears to have been poorly focused and it's limited achievements appear to be consistent with the equipment, personnel resources and expertise available.

48. The team was satisfied that the information it had gathered during the investigation, regarding the resources, capabilities and activities of Section 6240, was consistent with a loosely co-ordinated and largely empirical approach to LIS, but not consistent with the achievement of substantial progress in what is a complex technology. There were no indications that the efforts of Section 6240 reached the point of an integrated experiment that achieved any isotopic separation of either elemental uranium or UF_6 or that they had developed, even the most rudimentary capabilities in either AVLIS of MLIS technologies.

49. It was also apparent from statements made in the course of the inspection, by the Iraqi scientists and senior officials, that export controls and voluntary refusals on the part of several equipment suppliers had severely hampered the Iraqi LIS activities by preventing the procurement, from abroad, of critical pieces of equipment, most notably copper vapour laser systems.

Tuwaitha
Nuclear Research Center
33-12N 044-30E



Tarmiya

EMIS Uranium Enrichment Facility / Al Safaa

33-36N 044-23E

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1207
24 October 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 22 OCTOBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to send you attached the text of a statement made to the Iraqi news agency on 22 October 1994 by Mr. Muhammad Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning two discussion papers that were handed to the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations by the Permanent Representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom to the United Nations.

I should be grateful if you would inform the members of the Security Council of the above-mentioned statement and have it circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq on 22 October 1994

The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated:

Last Friday afternoon the representative of the United States of America and the representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations separately handed discussion papers to our Permanent Representative in New York containing the interpretation of the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the United States of America of Security Council resolution 949 (1994).

This action by the United States of America and the United Kingdom is a strange one: how is it that these two Governments take it upon themselves to interpret a resolution of the Security Council in a manner that suits themselves?

This is just one more attempt by these two Governments to control the Security Council and to impose their tyrannical views on it.

Iraq confirmed its good intentions in the Iraqi-Russian declaration issued on 13 October, in the declaration made by the Deputy Prime Minister to the Security Council on 17 October 1994 and also by concrete measures that it took even before the issuance of resolution 949 (1994).

The domination of the United States of America and the United Kingdom over the resolutions and actions of the Security Council is the main reason why the Council was diverted from its original intentions, failed to achieve legal compliance with its resolutions and, consequently, failed to lift the current blockade of Iraq. The position of these two domineering Governments is intrinsically different from those of the majority of States members of the Council.

We shall inform the members of the Council of this unilateral action by the United States of America and the United Kingdom and shall emphasize the need for the interpretation of Security Council resolutions to be legal, equitable and balanced.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1208
24 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 OCTOBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey to you herewith the third report of the Multinational Force in Haiti, submitted to the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 13 of Council resolution 940 (1994).

I would be grateful if you would circulate this as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Madeleine K. ALBRIGHT

Annex

Third report of the Multinational Force in Haiti dated 24 October 1994

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 940 (1994) authorizes "Member States to form a multinational force ... to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement."

2. Paragraph 13 of the resolution requests "Member States, acting in accordance with paragraph 4, ... to report to the Security Council at regular intervals."

3. This is the third such report, summarizing the fourth and fifth week of operations of the Multinational Force in Haiti. It reports on the coalition's progress towards achieving the objectives laid down in paragraph 4 of resolution 940 (1994).

II. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

4. The two-week period from 9 to 23 October 1994 saw the emotional and successful return to power of the legitimate Haitian authorities, highlighted by the return on 15 October of President Aristide. The top leadership and de facto President and cabinet ministers left their positions, and the leadership left the country between 10 and 13 October.

5. Multinational Force troop operations have included patrols and guarding of government installations such as the Parliament. Other activities are weapons confiscation and buy-back, police training and monitoring and humanitarian surveys. As of 20 October, there were approximately 16,750 Multinational Force troops in Haiti, down from about 21,000 at the operation's beginning. There were 602 police monitors, from 11 countries, in Haiti, as of the same date. The police monitors are engaged in joint patrolling operations with the Multinational Force military police and Force Armée d'Haiti police.

6. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) battalion has been in Haiti since early October and is guarding the port. The Bangladeshi contingent (1,050) arrived between 19 and 21 October and 134 troops from Guatemala arrived on 21 October.

7. Haiti has been relatively quiet during the period covered by the present report, with the exception of two incidents where buses ran through civilian crowds, killing a number of Haitians as well as several other incidents of violence. Multinational Force contingents, especially military police and civil affairs, were able to defuse tense situations on a number of occasions. Haiti

has reached a level of security and stability that compares favourably to many other places in the world.

8. The people on the street support President Aristide, whose picture is everywhere. Commerce, automobile and truck traffic have steadily increased, as has the number of people out on the street. Many people now come out at night, in stark contrast to a month ago, because some electricity is back on and because the environment is more secure.

9. The Front révolutionnaire pour l'avancement et le progrés en Haiti (FRAPH), attachés and the Force Armée d'Haiti no longer pose a serious threat, separately or together, to the Multinational Force. The October 3 Multinational Force raid on FRAPH headquarters appears to have modified FRAPH's behaviour and ability to operate and influence. It has been further affected by the departure of the coup leaders, and the return of President Aristide. The attachés mainly have been quiet. They are potentially dangerous in small groups, but seem to be deterred from carrying out attacks on the Multinational Force. The Multinational Force had detained a total of 192 and still held 39 as of 17 October. Those released have been determined to not present a threat or been involved in a documentable serious crime. Suspected attachés are turned over to Haitian authorities for further investigation.

10. The weapons buy-back programme has been in operation throughout the country, but mainly in Port-au-Prince. As of 21 October, the buy-back programme had netted 3,247 weapons, and another 8,863 had been confiscated. The Multinational Force has destroyed weapons larger than machine-guns, including V-150's, mortars and anti-aircraft weapons. The Multinational Force has also conducted 35 company-sized operations on arms caches since 1 October; 20 of these raids produced weapons and/or detainees.

11. The Force Armée d'Haiti (military and police) has almost ceased to exist as an organization and is not a military threat to the Multinational Force. The police are ineffective and the military is in disarray. The Multinational Force has a presence in - and in many cases, occupies - Force Armée d'Haiti military barracks all over Haiti.

III. ESTABLISHING A SECURE AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT

12. Government of Haiti officials agreed to review a proposal for the restructuring of a scaled-down Haitian armed forces, with emphasis on engineering and civil affairs. In addition, a plan for vetting the armed forces for human rights offenders, criminals and those suspected of drug trafficking is being implemented. Dissident elements of the Force Armée d'Haiti, much like attachés, could still be a problem. There have been no known human rights abuses by the police since 20 September.

13. The Multinational Force is working closely with the police monitors and International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Programme (ICITAP) to improve police performance and professionalize the force. A new police company was established in Cap Haitien, composed of Force Armé d'Haiti police from other areas of Haiti and some new recruits who have been trained by ICITAP

and who operate with the international police monitors. ICITAP is to begin its formal one-week training classes in Port-au-Prince on 24 October, for 375 trainees. The six-month ICITAP police academy course will begin in January.

14. As the Multinational Force operation continues, substantial progress has been made in re-establishing democracy in Haiti. The return of President Aristide and the members of the cabinet, the reconvening of Parliament, and President Aristide's call for reconciliation, have brought the Haitian climate closer to normal. The lifting on 16 October of economic sanctions and the resumption of commercial flights have positively affected the Haitian economy and general population.

15. Civilian fuel delivery began on 19 October and reached service stations in the Port-au-Prince area. No incidents were reported. Delivery to outlying areas is to begin on 22 October. Warehouse and feeding centre incidents have become increasingly rare. The Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) warehouse, located in the Carrefour district, has had repeated incidents and has been advised on several occasions to move from its present location by the Multinational Force and the United States Agency for International Development.

16. During the period covered by the present report, civil affairs teams conducted area assessments with a particular focus on drainage, erosion control, firefighting systems, landfill operations, market repair/construction, power generation and distribution facilities, schools repair, street clean-up and water collection, treatment and distribution systems. In specified areas, functional civil affairs specialists conducted detailed assessments of particular public health, public works and utilities, and public safety concerns.

UNITED NATIONS **A S**

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/49/568
S/1994/1209
24 October 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 38
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 22 October 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, and with reference to our previous letters concerning Israeli attacks on Lebanon, I regret to have to inform you that, since 20 October 1994, the Israeli occupation forces have carried out daily attacks on south Lebanon in the form of escalating bombardments from air and land, using a number of different kinds of weapons, including nail bombs, the use of which is internationally outlawed. The artillery bombardment by Israeli forces based on Tellat al-Dabché, directed against the town of Nabatiyah, caused the deaths of seven citizens, one of whom was a sergeant in the Lebanese army, the injury of six others, some of them critically, and serious material damage to houses, property and crops.

These most recent Israeli bombardments represent a new instalment in the series of destructive and bloody Israeli attacks undertaken by the forces of occupation; they constitute unjustifiable acts of provocation, and an extension and reinforcement of the occupation of Lebanese territory in contravention of the United Nations Charter and Security Council resolutions, especially resolution 425 (1978).

The Lebanese Government condemns and rejects these new attacks on the sovereignty of Lebanon and the security of its citizens, and requests the international community, as represented by the members of the Security Council, especially the five permanent members, and the Secretariat, to intervene in order to persuade Israel to cease its attacks on Lebanese territory immediately, and comply with the principles of international law and Security Council resolutions.

I should be grateful if you could circulate this letter as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 38, and as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Samir MOUBARAK
Permanent Representative

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UNITED NATIONS **A S**

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/49/569
S/1994/1210
24 October 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 139
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON RELATIONS WITH THE HOST COUNTRY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 23 October 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I wish to inform you that the contents of the letter dated 14 October 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to you (A/49/548) does not correctly reflect the truth with respect to the events to which we referred in our letter dated 11 September 1994 (A/49/377-S/1994/1047). Moreover, the representative of the United States disregards the circumstances and events which indicate that the United States authorities are imposing restrictions and obstacles which do not facilitate, and at times prevent, the issuance to Iraqi officials of entry visas for the purpose of their participation in United Nations activities. Without wishing to enter into a dispute, I should like to refer here to an example of this, namely the failure of the Mission of the United States of America to reply, by the date of submission of this letter, to the request made by this Mission on 6 September 1994 to grant Ambassador Barzan Ibrahim Al-Tikriti, the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations Office at Geneva, an entry visa for participation, as a member of the delegation of the Republic of Iraq, in the work of the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Government of my country, in referring to these unfortunate incidents, cherishes the hope that the obligations incumbent upon the host State under the Headquarters Agreement will be performed in good faith.

I request that this letter be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 139, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1211
25 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 OCTOBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE BAHAMAS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that, with effect from 19 October 1994, the Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas revoked the order which had imposed sanctions against Haiti in accordance with Security Council resolutions. A copy of the order is attached.

I would be grateful if you would circulate the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Harcourt L. TURNQUEST
Permanent Representative

Annex

The International Obligations (Economic and Ancillary Measures) Act, 1993 (No. 17 of 1993)

The International Obligations (Economic and Ancillary Measures) (Haiti) (No. 2) (Revocation) Order, 1994

The Governor-General, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the International Obligations (Economic and Ancillary Measures) Act, 1993, makes the following order.

1. This Order may be cited as the International Obligations (Economic and Ancillary Measures) (Haiti) (No. 2) (Revocation) Order, 1994.

2. The International Obligations (Economic and Ancillary Measures) Act, 1993, is revoked.

Made the 19th day of October, 1994.

(Signed) Clifford DARLING
Governor-General

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1212
31 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in compliance with paragraph 14 of resolution 920 (1994), by which the Security Council requested me to report by 1 November 1994 on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), including on the fulfilment and completion of its mandate and on modalities for its progressive withdrawal. In the same paragraph, the Council invited me to prepare modalities for assistance to El Salvador, within the framework of the peace accords, for the post-ONUSAL period.

2. As members of the Security Council will recall, I last reported on ONUSAL on 26 August 1994 (see S/1994/1000). Given that my report contained a detailed account of the state of implementation of outstanding commitments under the peace accords, the present report provides an overall assessment of the process in its political, institutional and socio-economic dimensions and evaluates the effort required to build a solid basis that will ensure, as far as possible, its irreversibility.

3. Political life in El Salvador continues to adjust to the rules of democracy, as embodied in the Constitution which has been reformed in accordance with the peace accords. The legislative, executive and judicial branches of the State respect their respective attributions, public security and national defence are exercised through separate institutional structures and all major political parties have entered a process of internal discussion to adjust to the new parameters created by the transition from a society divided by a prolonged civil war to a democratic system directed towards reconciliation, stability and development.

4. Helped by political stability, the Salvadorian economy continued to grow at over 5 per cent in 1993, reflecting strength in construction and commerce in the private sector. The fall in the budget deficit to 3 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1993 can be explained by increased tax revenue and the rationalization of expenditure. The rate of inflation fell to 12 per cent, the lowest level in the last five years. In spite of the real appreciation of the colón, non-traditional exports grew by about 18 per cent, probably helped by increases in productivity. A rise in the volume of coffee production also

contributed to export growth. In spite of export growth, the trade deficit reached $1.2 billion in 1993. Economic growth has been even more dynamic during the first half of 1994. The increase in the price of coffee in 1994 is expected to increase export revenue in 1995.

5. Despite this real progress, certain issues remain to be resolved before all pending commitments under the peace accords can be said to have been met. These issues relate to the full deployment of the National Civil Police; the completion of the demobilization of the National Police; the reform of the judicial and electoral systems; the transfer of land to former combatants and the conclusion of some important economic reintegration programmes for their benefit; the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth; and the completion of the ongoing process to extend all public services to the former conflict zones.

II. ISSUES RELATING TO PUBLIC SECURITY

6. Since I last reported to the Security Council, the territorial deployment of the National Civil Police has continued, leaving only parts of 2 of the country's 14 departments without full coverage. While all nine functional divisions of the National Civil Police are now deployed, some of them are not yet fully operational. Increasing disciplinary problems, combined with continued deficiencies in training and gaps in the legal framework that governs the operations of the National Civil Police, underline again the need for a more expeditious and effective implementation of ONUSAL's recommendations for the correction of irregularities in the National Civil Police and the functioning of the National Public Security Academy (see S/1994/1000, paras. 16-25) in order to avoid a further erosion of public confidence in the new force. Until this is done, the National Civil Police will remain fragile and unable to develop as an effective enforcer of the law. This could result in a tendency to establish order through practices outside the legal framework. It is hoped that the recently appointed Inspector-General who, as provided by the peace agreement (see S/23501, annex, chap. II, 3, B, (b)), will be responsible for monitoring and supervising the operations of the National Civil Police, will be provided with the necessary means to address these negative trends.

7. While demobilization of the National Police has accelerated and the Government has informed ONUSAL that the process will be largely completed by 31 December 1994, a detailed plan for phasing out the remaining personnel has not yet been received by ONUSAL. It is still unclear whether the requirements set out in the 19 May 1994 timetable for the implementation of the most important outstanding agreements (see S/1994/612, annex, para. 3.F.2) will be met for the admission into the Academy of additional National Police candidates. In addition, the Customs Police will not be fully demobilized until 31 March 1995, the final deadline envisaged under the 19 May timetable (see ibid., para. 3.B).

III. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

8. The human rights situation in El Salvador has improved markedly during ONUSAL's three years of operation. The work of the mission's Human Rights Division has been the subject of periodic reports by its Director, the next one of which will be submitted shortly. The Division's verification has been implemented by investigation of human rights violations and the strengthening of national institutions, so as to overcome deficiencies and leave these institutions with the capacity to meet the demands of the peace accords.

9. In the past six months, ONUSAL's Human Rights Division has emphasized the strengthening of national institutions such as the National Council of the Judiciary, the office of the Attorney-General of the Republic, the National Civil Police and the National Public Security Academy, as well as the development of a new doctrine for the Armed Forces. In July, a mechanism for the joint verification of human rights violations was established with the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights, together with a training and specialization programme for officials of the National Counsel. The Division has also continued to conduct seminars and specialized workshops on human rights for members of the judicial system, the Armed Forces and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) active in the field of human rights. These activities have been complemented by the publication of a series of books and pamphlets on human rights.

10. In this phase of the peace process, institution-building is crucial for the consolidation of the progress achieved in the protection of human rights and due process. In view of the future winding-up of ONUSAL, programmes to ensure continuous support for institution-building are being prepared.

11. Progress in the strengthening of the judiciary has been achieved through the adoption of legislation that enhances the protection of human rights and seeks a more independent and efficient judicial system. However, serious deficiencies still exist that prevent the eradication of impunity. With the establishment of the new Supreme Court of Justice (see S/1994/1000, para. 5), conditions are in place for the required reform of the judicial system, an issue that must be promptly and effectively addressed by the new Court, together with the adequate training of judges. While initial progress has been made on the latter issue through specialized courses for judges sponsored by ONUSAL, this task should now be assumed on a permanent basis by the Supreme Court and the Judicial Training School, with the support of the international community. Without the completion of judicial reform, the institutional framework for guaranteeing the rule of law and respect for human rights will remain weak, notwithstanding the development of the National Civil Police and parallel efforts to strengthen the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights.

IV. ELECTORAL SYSTEM

12. Following its election in July 1994 (see S/1994/1000, para. 42), the new Supreme Electoral Tribunal has begun discussing reform. A commission of members from various political parties, serving in their individual capacity, has been set up at the Government's initiative. The Tribunal has focused on the

preparation of a single identity and voting document, a task in which it has received the technical support of the Electoral Advisory and Promotion Centre of the Inter-American Human Rights Institute (IIDH/CAPEL). Should the IIDH/CAPEL proposal be implemented, a new electoral roll could be in place in time for the 1997 legislative elections, while the new identity/voting document would be ready for the 1999 presidential elections. Other reforms under discussion relate to measures for voting in the area of residence and provisions to ensure some form of representation in municipal councils for parties in addition to the one obtaining the largest number of votes.

13. A thorny issue, which stems from the politicization of the Tribunal, is the assignment of quotas to the largest political parties for the recruitment of the Tribunal's personnel. Continued resistance by some members to modification of this rule could undermine the Tribunal's professionalism. Repairing this basic flaw in the system is essential if the Tribunal is to be truly independent and reliable.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE TRUTH

14. ONUSAL continues to insist on the implementation of the judicial reforms and other recommendations of the Commission on the Truth, which are binding upon the parties under the peace accords, especially those referring to the ratification of international human rights treaties, including recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. A number of recommendations not requiring legislative action are also still pending.

VI. SOCIO-ECONOMIC MATTERS

A. Land-transfer programme

15. I am pleased to report that 1,006 beneficiaries have received title to land since mid-August. However, in spite of a number of measures taken by the Government to accelerate the land-transfer programme through decentralization of decision-making and streamlining of procedures, exactly two years after the land programme was accepted by the parties only 32 per cent of the established total of 40,648 potential beneficiaries (see S/1994/1000, para. 28) have received land. These 12,942 beneficiaries have received a total of 51,303 manzanas, the average per beneficiary thus being slightly less than 4 manzanas (2.8 hectares). The remaining operational problems should not be underestimated since the land to be transferred is in smaller plots and it will therefore be necessary to deal with a larger number of landowners; the land is of lower quality and therefore more of it will be needed; and it is located in areas without a dependable registry of properties. The relocation of an estimated 8,000 landholders, which should be left for the end of the programme as stipulated in the 13 October 1992 agreement, will also be a problem not only because of the psychological difficulties associated with relocation but also because of the lack of adequate alternatives in a country with such an acute land shortage. Given the delay in the implementation of this programme and the difficulties that lie ahead, I made a personal appeal to President Calderón Sol last month to adopt measures to

facilitate the rapid completion of this programme. I have also urged both the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) and the Armed Forces to refrain from any further effort to revise and/or add to the list of potential beneficiaries.

16. The expiry earlier this year of a decree which, pursuant to the peace accords, barred eviction of landholders in the former conflict zones, has been a source of concern, particularly because of the expectations of eviction that it created among landowners. However, on 1 September the Legislative Assembly extended landholders' protection from eviction. Another welcome development was the adoption on 11 October of a decree to expedite procedures for the legalisation of unregistered properties and for the solution of several other problems affecting lands to be transferred. On the other hand, the adoption on 22 September of a decree by which only titled landowners are allowed to sell their coffee beans is a new source of concern.

17. In addition to the problem of transferring land, there is the problem of human settlements (referred to in the agreements as predios e inmuebles), which is the most serious problem that remains to be resolved. At my request, my Special Representative has urged the Government to adopt a flexible policy to ensure that the settlements can be easily and quickly transferred. Such flexibility is called for because strict interpretation of the rules of the 13 October 1992 land programme would prevent such transfer. The socio-political consequences of breaking up these settlements would be serious (see S/1994/561, paras. 76 and 87 and S/1994/1000, para. 56), and it was for this reason that the Government had agreed to adopt a new policy.

B. Reintegration programmes

18. Although progress can be reported with regard to some reintegration programmes, there are still delays. The programme for agricultural credit, which is essential to reactivate production in the zones of conflict, is still paralysed. Another matter of concern is the Government's unilateral decision to reduce credit to landholders from 10,000 to 4,000 colones. This will deprive them of the ability to produce the minimum required for subsistence and servicing their debts. At the same time, the agricultural technical assistance programme to beneficiaries of the land programme continues to cover only a small number of properties. Without agricultural credit and technical assistance, there is no possibility that the few who have benefited from the land programme will be able to become successful producers and service their debt, particularly in view of the small amount of land to which they have been entitled.

19. Delays in housing programmes, including those targeted for middle-level former commanders of FMLN ("plan 600"), are also a source of concern, as is the lack of adequate resources for the Fund for the Protection of the Wounded and War-Disabled as a Consequence of the Armed Conflict (see S/26790, para. 70).

20. Also disturbing is the announcement by the National Reconstruction Secretariat of the closure of reintegration programmes for demobilized personnel of the Armed Forces, owing to lack of financial resources.

21. Understandably, these situations are creating serious discontent among the affected groups. The recent takeover of the Legislative Assembly, not for the first time, by a group of disgruntled former combatants of the armed forces who held hostage 27 legislators from various parties from 26 to 28 September has brought these tensions into focus. With ONUSAL as intermediary, talks were arranged and agreement was reached on ways to accelerate the completion of compensation payments, the implementation of established programmes and the incorporation of former members of paramilitary bodies in regular social programmes.

VII. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

22. The restoration of public administration in former conflict zones has been virtually completed as regards the return of mayors and judges, but education, health care and other basic services are still lacking in several areas. Thorough reconstruction of the areas most ravaged by the war can be achieved only by making a decisive effort to extend these essential services to them. The Government has been urged repeatedly to give priority to these needs. It argues, however, that shortages in funding and resources have prevented the provision of basic services even in areas that were not affected by the conflict.

VIII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

23. The Fifth Committee, by its draft decision contained in document A/C.5/49/L.3 of 11 October 1994, recommended to the General Assembly that the Secretary-General be given authority to enter into commitments for the operation of ONUSAL in the amount of $5,643,700 gross ($5,040,800 net) for the period ending 30 November 1994. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the current mandate of the Observer Mission beyond 30 November 1994, I shall request the General Assembly at its current session to make adequate financial provisions for the extension of the Mission.

24. As at 24 October 1994, unpaid assessed contributions to the ONUSAL special account (including the United Nations Observer Group for Central America) since the inception of the mission amounted to $23.8 million. In order to provide ONUSAL with the necessary cash-flow, a total of $9 million has been borrowed from other peace-keeping accounts. These loans remain unpaid. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations on 24 October 1994 amounted to $1,630.9 million.

IX. OBSERVATIONS

25. The Government of President Armando Calderón Sol has repeatedly confirmed its commitment to comply fully with those elements of the peace accords that remain to be implemented. The leadership and a large majority of the Armed Forces have also expressed the same commitment, even though a relatively small political sector continues to regard the armed forces as having made a disproportionate sacrifice as a consequence of the peace accords. This evidence

of sustained political will is encouraging. However, it must be matched by concrete action and the capacity to activate still recalcitrant sectors within the administration. Delay in implementation of the outstanding commitments has also been due to lack of organization and expertise - a common phenomenon in developing countries - and, in some instances, to lack of financing. Furthermore, in compliance with the peace accords, some crucial elements still require the presence and assistance of the United Nations playing its verification and good offices role.

26. The joint declaration made on 4 October 1994 by the Government and FMLN, which reconfirmed the commitment of both signatories to complete implementation of the peace accords (see S/1994/1144), bears witness to the political will mentioned above. The parties intend to work out promptly specific agreements to accelerate implementation of the outstanding issues and to send a joint mission to donor countries and institutions to seek the funds still required to finance the programmes.

27. In addition to the delays in implementing the land and other reintegration programmes, inadequacies in the provision of credit and technical assistance are endangering their success and sustainability. United Nations agencies and programmes need to become more involved, but with a common design and strategy. Success of the reintegration programmes is critical to the consolidation of the peace process. Failure or continued delays could give rise to serious upheaval, as has been the case in other countries, including neighbouring ones. Promises have been made and they must be kept. A strong and urgent push to these programmes as well as to the problem of human settlements is imperative.

28. The United Nations undertaking in El Salvador has been innovative in a variety of ways. The Organization played a central role in the negotiation of the peace accords from start to finish and has overseen a multidimensional peace-keeping and peace-building operation in whose design it played a key part. It remains engaged in the transition from peace-keeping to post-conflict peace-building. This involves not only security-related aspects such as the abolition of the old military-controlled National Police and the creation of a new National Civil Police, following the reform of the Armed Forces in a role confined to defence against external threat, but also key institutional reforms designed to entrench the rule of law and provide a solid framework to guarantee respect for human rights. Last but not least, the United Nations supports a complex set of programmes for the reintegration into society of former combatants of both sides and of the rural populations who occupied land in conflict zones during the years of armed confrontation. In endorsing the Secretary-General's negotiating efforts and subsequently the peace accords themselves, the Security Council accepted the request of the parties that the United Nations verify compliance with all the agreements reached therein. The Council has confirmed this acceptance and did so again recently when it adopted the statement made on its behalf by the President on 16 September 1994 (S/PRST/1994/54).

29. The Salvadorian peace process holds the promise of being a remarkably successful achievement once it is completed. However, certain key undertakings have yet to be fully implemented, although it is expected that this can be done within a reasonable period of time. Both the Government of El Salvador and FMLN

have stressed to me that, if that goal is to be achieved, it is essential for the United Nations to fulfil its commitment to the Salvadorian people to verify the full implementation of the peace accords. To this end I am exercising maximum suasion on the parties, both directly and through my Special Representative, reminding them of the international community's expectation that each will honour its commitments in full and promptly. In these circumstances, I believe that it is essential to retain ONUSAL in existence for one further mandate period, albeit at much reduced strength not exceeding a total of 100 international staff, to ensure that the incomplete undertakings are fully implemented, particularly until such a time as the National Police is completely disbanded and the National Civil Police is fully deployed and operational. These goals in the public security field should be accomplished in about five months. At that time it would be possible to consider how best to approach the remaining verification duties incumbent upon the Organization, which, although they would not involve United Nations military or police personnel, nevertheless concern critical and sensitive components of the peace accords. These include the institutional reforms in the judiciary, the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth and, most of all, the reintegration programmes, especially the extremely slow-moving land programme, which are critical to a durable peace.

30. Accordingly, I recommend to the Security Council the extension of ONUSAL until 30 April 1995, at which date that part of its functions which require military and police personnel will have been completed. Before the Mission's termination, I would present to the Security Council my thoughts on mechanisms to maintain United Nations verification thereafter, as well as information on technical assistance programmes in the fields of human rights, the judiciary, the electoral system and reintegration, especially land transfers, that would contribute to long-term political and social stability in the country. This approach responds to the widely held view that the termination of ONUSAL should not mark the end of United Nations efforts to consolidate peace in El Salvador.

31. In concluding, I pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Enrique ter Horst, and to all the personnel of ONUSAL for the dedication, perseverance and exemplary manner in which they are carrying out the mandate entrusted to them. They have spared no effort to restore hope to the people of El Salvador and consolidate peace in their long-suffering country.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1213
25 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 25 OCTOBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I must inform about a new escalation of aggressive activities by the paramilitary units under the control of the Bosnian Serb leadership against Zupanja and Rajovo Selo, on the territory of the Republic of Croatia. Today's attack with at least 20 impacts follows similar daily attacks that commenced last week.

Moreover, these and earlier acts of aggression against the Zupanja region, and the earlier attacks on the Dubrovnik region, establish a clear pattern of the Bosnian Serb military resources being used on behalf of Belgrade's proxies in the occupied territories of Croatia.

My Government has on numerous occasions pointed out this negative linkage between the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the situation in Croatia, and has insisted that this costly linkage must be compensated in a positive way. The international community must take measures, political and real, that would prevent further cooperation between the parties, for the benefit of both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

May I request your kind assistance in distributing this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Permanent Representative

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/49/573
S/1994/1214
25 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 39
THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 25 October 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit the attached statement from the representative of parliamentarian parties of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, dated 24 October 1994.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this statement as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 39, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement dated 24 October 1994 by the representatives of parliamentarian parties of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The parliamentarian political parties of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina express their deep appreciation, results notwithstanding, for United Nations efforts towards achieving peace in our region. They also express their sincere gratitude for the overwhelming efforts of the international community in delivering humanitarian aid, including the crucial "air drops", that have enabled hundreds of thousands of civilians to survive. We avail ourselves of this opportunity to convey, on behalf of the members and citizens of the internationally recognized Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, our most sincere appreciation and gratitude to the members of the international community.

In this respect, the conduct of Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, Commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in diverting the attention and resolve of the free world from punishing criminal acts and fascism to peripheral issues is unacceptable.

His request for the withdrawal of the forces of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while simultaneously tolerating the threats of Serb aggressors against the only overland communication route between Sarajevo and the rest of the world, is yet another manifestation of such behaviour.

It is clear that units of the Bosnian Army have started their withdrawal. Yet, nothing has been done to secure the route near Hrasnica, which is constantly exposed to the aggressor's artillery fire.

The parliamentarian political parties request that the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina hold a dialogue on relations between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and UNPROFOR, based upon the consistent implementation of all United Nations resolutions and decisions on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, all efforts should be taken to bring to the knowledge of the international community the wide range of flagrant violations of our laws as well as international law by some members of the UNPROFOR forces.

We therefore request that Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose relinquish his current post and duties. We request an objective and impartial commander who would carry out the implementation of United Nations resolutions on the

ground, an individual who would serve legitimate United Nations interests, rather than the interests of his/her national Government.

Party of Democratic Action
Croatian Democratic Community
Social Democrat Party
Union of Bosnian Social Democrats
Citizens' Democrat Party
Liberal Party
Liberal Bosniac Organization
Croatian Peasants' Party

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1215
26 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 17 OCTOBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UZBEKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to transmit the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan issued on 14 October 1994 in Tashkent.

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uzbekistan also has the honour to request that the text of this note verbale and its annex be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Annex

[Original: Russian]

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan of 14 October 1994

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan is seriously concerned and indignant at the accusations - which have lately become more frequent - made by official organs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, which have accused Uzbekistan of "interference" in Afghanistan's internal affairs, in particular the accusation that the armed forces of Uzbekistan are interfering in the internal war of opposing forces in Afghanistan.

We most firmly reject this baseless defamation of Uzbekistan and declare that the aforementioned accusations are nothing more than attempts by certain forces in Afghanistan and outside its borders to diminish Uzbekistan's prestige in the eyes of the international community, undermine its peacemaking efforts, aggravate relations between the two neighbouring States and escalate tension in the region.

Uzbekistan has always expressed its profound concern at the continuing armed confrontation and fratricidal war in Afghanistan and has repeatedly declared its readiness to discuss, with all interested States, concrete measures that could facilitate the solution of the Afghan problem. We have always adhered to the firm and principled position that the Afghan question must be settled through peaceful means, which excludes the interference of any State in its internal affairs. At the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, Uzbekistan put forward the initiative of organizing in Tashkent, under United Nations auspices, a standing seminar on problems of regional security.

The position of strict neutrality and non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan was expressed in the joint statement on Afghanistan by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation on 8 February 1994 (S/1994/156, annex).

At the Tashkent seminar conducted by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in September 1994, Uzbekistan underscored the need to involve all healthy forces of the region and the international community in the peaceful settlement of the conflicts in Afghanistan, at a time when Uzbekistan had once again been subjected to the gross and provocative accusation of armed interference in the affairs of that unfortunate country.

On 4 October 1994, at a plenary meeting of the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Uzbekistan reaffirmed the inadmissibility of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and the need to impose an embargo on the import of weapons into areas of regional conflicts.

Uzbekistan expects that the leaders of Afghanistan and its diverse political forces will correctly assess Uzbekistan's concern and peacemaking role in the prevention of conflicts in the region and its efforts to develop

good-neighbourly relations and all-round, mutually advantageous cooperation with independent and sovereign Afghanistan in the interests of strengthening a spirit of mutual understanding and confidence in the region, and will take measures to prevent the machinations of the enemies of that spirit, both within Afghanistan and outside its borders, demonstrate true patriotic wisdom and, bearing in mind the grave consequences of the fratricidal war, focus their efforts on achieving national reconciliation in the interests and for the benefit of the entire Afghan nation.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1216
27 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 October 1994 (S/1994/1197),

Reaffirming its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Angola,

Reiterating the importance it attaches to the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Commending the efforts of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the Force Commander and personnel of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), the three observer States to the Angolan Peace Process, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and some neighbouring States, in particular the Government of Zambia, and encouraging them to continue their efforts aimed at the earliest resolution of the Angolan crisis through negotiations within the framework of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Encouraged by the substantial progress made recently in the Lusaka Peace Talks and reaffirming the importance of the parties showing flexibility and bringing them to a prompt and successful conclusion and achieving a comprehensive settlement,

Declaring that renewed obstruction or procrastination in the peace process would be unacceptable,

Deeply concerned, however, at continued military hostilities throughout the territory of Angola which cause extensive suffering to the civilian population and obstruct humanitarian relief efforts, and have delayed the successful conclusion of the Lusaka Peace Talks and hampered the effective implementation of the current mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission UNAVEM II,

Reaffirming the obligation of all States to implement fully the provisions of paragraph 19 of resolution 864 (1993),

Emphasizing that Angolans bear ultimate responsibility for the successful implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and any subsequent agreement,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 October 1994;

2. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAVEM II until 8 December 1994;

3. Calls upon the parties to honour the commitments already made by them at the talks in Lusaka and urges them to conclude immediately an agreement and thereafter to establish and respect fully an effective and sustainable cease-fire as a matter of urgency;

4. Authorizes, with the aim of consolidating the implementation of the peace agreement in its initial and most critical stages, the restoration of the strength of UNAVEM II to its previous level of 350 military observers and 126 police observers with an appropriate number of international and local staff, the deployment of such additional personnel to take place upon receipt of a report from the Secretary-General to the Council that the parties have initialled a peace agreement and that an effective cease-fire is in place;

5. Reaffirms its readiness to consider promptly, once the agreement to be concluded in Lusaka is formally signed, a report from the Secretary-General containing any recommendation for an expanded United Nations presence in Angola based on his assessment of the circumstances that warrant that, and welcomes the contingency planning done in this regard by the Secretary-General;

6. Deplores the continuation of military hostilities throughout Angola contrary to resolutions 922 (1994), 932 (1994), and 945 (1994) and reiterates its demand that both parties cease immediately all military operations;

7. Further deplores the deterioration in the humanitarian situation; condemns all acts, including the laying of landmines, that imperil or inhibit humanitarian relief efforts; and demands that both parties grant security clearances and guarantees for relief deliveries to all locations and refrain from any action which could jeopardize the safety of relief personnel or disrupt the distribution of humanitarian assistance to the Angolan people;

8. Reiterates in this context its demand for the immediate release by the responsible parties of the humanitarian relief workers who disappeared on 27 August 1994 and its call for the complete cooperation of the parties, especially UNITA, with the United Nations investigation into their disappearance;

9. Commends those States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have already contributed to the relief efforts, and appeals to all States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations rapidly to provide further assistance to Angola to meet the growing humanitarian need;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the Council is informed of further developments in the Lusaka Peace Talks and on the military and humanitarian situation in Angola;

11. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.